On reflection, I realized that I have not only tweeted extensively on Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, but also written several long-form articles in the leadup to the Russian invasion, and the immediate aftermath.
Seems like the likely result is a split among the Dnieper, no peace treaty (so like the Korean War) and a hyper-pissed-off ultra-militarized West Ukraine (backed by the West) as part of the Western Alliance. The Russian forces now congregating around Kyiv seem really easy to cut off. Only one bridge back to Belarus, and I would think it would be easy to keep armies from crossing a river as wide as the Dnieper. I'm actually surprised that UA hasn't blown up more bridges yet.
Mass prisoners exchange.
The interesting questions are:
1. Would Putin allow anyone who wants to to cross over to West Ukraine?
2. How long can he keep a hold of East Ukraine? Without a peace settlement, the sanctions aren't coming off, so Russia's economy will remain a basketcase (yes, there's China, but Russia will essentially become late-stage Soviet Union again) and he'll have to subsidize East Ukraine heavily (and likely have to put down insurgencies too). Occupations aren't cheap.
There are Western generals who have studied the Russian military who think Ukraine can win outright. They're noting that Russian logistics are still awful, they are losing a decent amount of material before it gets to the frontline, morale is in the toilet, the number of high quality troops they have isn't that large (they have a lot of conscripts and crap) and they are losing equipment and men at an unsustainable rate. According to US intelligence, the big assault on Kyiv hasn't started because that group doesn't have enough fuel and . . . . food.
If that's the case, Even Just in the East, they can surround the UA in Kharkiv and Mariupol and level both cities, maybe starve both cities out in a horrifying medieval siege (though it's unclear if NATO/EU still wouldn't intervene in that case; the Russian conventional military being shown to be a paper tiger leaves only crazy nuclear threats on the table, and how credible are they? Does Putin have a death wish?), but they'd still have territorial militia blowing up supply lines, harassing, and dealing out unsustainable damage to material. Can an army that can only surround cities and just has the artillery to level cities actually pacify an area that's half the size of Texas (so the size of FL) with the numbers Putin has given the low morale and decent-sized losses in material and men as well as poor resupply from a cratering economy? If this rate of attrition goes on for a month, Putin will have maybe half his invading force left even if he manages to wipe out the UA in the process. And he'd still have enraged local militias and citizens trying to pick them off every chance they get. So maybe it's possible that large sections of the invading Russian army collapsing and just giving up is the more likely scenario.
I am in the middle. I think there is a tendency to focus too much on the failings of the Russian conventional forces, and to ignore that despite their Western-social media operation, the Ukrainian Army is ultimately also a Soviet-style army. The Special Forces are US trained, and there has been a cultural penetration of Western ideas which have been reflected in some of the tactics, but the senior command went to Soviet military academies, and have aging equipment.
In short, I believe most of the stories about what is wrong with the Russian forces. I also credit the determination and morale of the Ukrainians. But I think the successful information war is concealing that the regular Ukrainian forces are in much worse shape. Some of the best evidence for that is the failure to hit that massive column advancing on Kyiv. In the last 24hrs we have seen a shift from video of downed Russian aircraft and destroyed vehicles for claims of victories or the destruction of an 800 vehicle column.
The Russians are struggling, and they are facing fierce resistance where the Ukrainians are dug in, but I think there is substantial evidence that the Ukrainian field forces have ceased to exist. And if the Ukrainians are no longer able to counterattack or maneuver then the question of the Russian advance becomes how long they can sustain such a campaign politically and logistically.
Those limitations are real. Once an army transitions from maneuver to siege operations it is very hard to switch back. Especially if a siege is politically and emotionally draining. I feel the example of Vukovar in 1991 is useful. The Yugoslav People's Army attacked it at the start of what was intended to be a mechanized drive through Zagreb to crush Croatia. They got bogged down in Vukovar for 87 days. By the time the city fell, the JNA had ceased to exist. Non-Serb and Yugoslav-minded Serb officers quit in disgust. Conscripts deserted. What was left was an empty shell surrounded by paramilitaries incapable of further operations. The JNA entered the battle as a mechanized force, and the fourth largest Army in Europe. It ended it as an ethnic paramilitary force.
The question in my mind is not whether the Russian army can "win" the battles for Kharkiv, Mariupol, or Kyiv. It is what sort of "Russian Army" will be left afterwards, especially if it takes 30 days as US intelligence suggests. That may not be a force capable of undertaking anything other police work.
Seems like the likely result is a split among the Dnieper, no peace treaty (so like the Korean War) and a hyper-pissed-off ultra-militarized West Ukraine (backed by the West) as part of the Western Alliance. The Russian forces now congregating around Kyiv seem really easy to cut off. Only one bridge back to Belarus, and I would think it would be easy to keep armies from crossing a river as wide as the Dnieper. I'm actually surprised that UA hasn't blown up more bridges yet.
Mass prisoners exchange.
The interesting questions are:
1. Would Putin allow anyone who wants to to cross over to West Ukraine?
2. How long can he keep a hold of East Ukraine? Without a peace settlement, the sanctions aren't coming off, so Russia's economy will remain a basketcase (yes, there's China, but Russia will essentially become late-stage Soviet Union again) and he'll have to subsidize East Ukraine heavily (and likely have to put down insurgencies too). Occupations aren't cheap.
HOWEVER
There are Western generals who have studied the Russian military who think Ukraine can win outright. They're noting that Russian logistics are still awful, they are losing a decent amount of material before it gets to the frontline, morale is in the toilet, the number of high quality troops they have isn't that large (they have a lot of conscripts and crap) and they are losing equipment and men at an unsustainable rate. According to US intelligence, the big assault on Kyiv hasn't started because that group doesn't have enough fuel and . . . . food.
If that's the case, Even Just in the East, they can surround the UA in Kharkiv and Mariupol and level both cities, maybe starve both cities out in a horrifying medieval siege (though it's unclear if NATO/EU still wouldn't intervene in that case; the Russian conventional military being shown to be a paper tiger leaves only crazy nuclear threats on the table, and how credible are they? Does Putin have a death wish?), but they'd still have territorial militia blowing up supply lines, harassing, and dealing out unsustainable damage to material. Can an army that can only surround cities and just has the artillery to level cities actually pacify an area that's half the size of Texas (so the size of FL) with the numbers Putin has given the low morale and decent-sized losses in material and men as well as poor resupply from a cratering economy? If this rate of attrition goes on for a month, Putin will have maybe half his invading force left even if he manages to wipe out the UA in the process. And he'd still have enraged local militias and citizens trying to pick them off every chance they get. So maybe it's possible that large sections of the invading Russian army collapsing and just giving up is the more likely scenario.
I am in the middle. I think there is a tendency to focus too much on the failings of the Russian conventional forces, and to ignore that despite their Western-social media operation, the Ukrainian Army is ultimately also a Soviet-style army. The Special Forces are US trained, and there has been a cultural penetration of Western ideas which have been reflected in some of the tactics, but the senior command went to Soviet military academies, and have aging equipment.
In short, I believe most of the stories about what is wrong with the Russian forces. I also credit the determination and morale of the Ukrainians. But I think the successful information war is concealing that the regular Ukrainian forces are in much worse shape. Some of the best evidence for that is the failure to hit that massive column advancing on Kyiv. In the last 24hrs we have seen a shift from video of downed Russian aircraft and destroyed vehicles for claims of victories or the destruction of an 800 vehicle column.
The Russians are struggling, and they are facing fierce resistance where the Ukrainians are dug in, but I think there is substantial evidence that the Ukrainian field forces have ceased to exist. And if the Ukrainians are no longer able to counterattack or maneuver then the question of the Russian advance becomes how long they can sustain such a campaign politically and logistically.
Those limitations are real. Once an army transitions from maneuver to siege operations it is very hard to switch back. Especially if a siege is politically and emotionally draining. I feel the example of Vukovar in 1991 is useful. The Yugoslav People's Army attacked it at the start of what was intended to be a mechanized drive through Zagreb to crush Croatia. They got bogged down in Vukovar for 87 days. By the time the city fell, the JNA had ceased to exist. Non-Serb and Yugoslav-minded Serb officers quit in disgust. Conscripts deserted. What was left was an empty shell surrounded by paramilitaries incapable of further operations. The JNA entered the battle as a mechanized force, and the fourth largest Army in Europe. It ended it as an ethnic paramilitary force.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Vukovar
The question in my mind is not whether the Russian army can "win" the battles for Kharkiv, Mariupol, or Kyiv. It is what sort of "Russian Army" will be left afterwards, especially if it takes 30 days as US intelligence suggests. That may not be a force capable of undertaking anything other police work.