Excellent stuff, but where does the EU's Mutual Defence Clause (42.7 in the Lisbon Treaty) fit in this calculation? It make specific reference to the reliance on pre-existing NATO obligations of member states as "the foundation of their collective defence".
Yes but do you believe a neutralised Ukraine, with membership in the EU, would be acceptable to Russia - bearing in mind this would mean Ukraine was a member of a defensive alliance which included 4 NATO members on Ukraine's Borders?
Great insight. Your "Zelensky Option" makes a lot of sense, but do you think Ukraine declaring it would not seek NATO membership would mean anything after this? The West would still undoubtedly start helping Ukraine arm itself to the point where it wouldn't be so overmatched if anything like this ever happened again.
I think the "promises" were always going to be variations of "worth little" and "worthless". Maintaining America's word, especially when delievered orally has not been a priority. Russia abstained on Libya in 2011 on the basis of a promise to avoid regime change and that reveled in Qadaffi's death.
That said, I think given the nature of what has taken place, Putin may well feel he has made his point. NATO membership for Ukraine is worth a war for Russia. The question now would be how much is Ukraine outside of NATO worth for the West. If the West's primary interest in Ukraine is the "Ukrainian people" then granting them EU membership, reconstruction funds and being willing to accept Russia's terms should be acceptable. If this was always about containing Russia, then the West will value keeping sanctions on Russia over Ukraine.
This is logical but the reason I advised caution is that while i think Putin 10 years ago almost certainly would have tried this track precisely because even if it fails the very failure would reveal Western "hypocrisy " I think he is long past having time for games. He will only pursue this if he wants it, and he believes it will work. I don't think he would invest heavily in an offer he has no interest in merely to prove a point. Things are a bit beyond that now
My guess is that Putin is going to break things, kill people, and withdraw. I suspect he'll settle for neutrality from that list.
As I've been telling people--rough analogy, but you meet people where they are--it's a little like Mexico joining the Warsaw Pact. The US would have real problems with this, primarily economic. Putin prefers Ukraine as a broken basket case. The issue with NATO is not NATO arms, but that NATO would clean Ukraine up--and the EU would put the cherry on top. If they could do this for Bulgaria, they could do it anywhere. (Yes, Bulgaria's terrible, but when my brother was a reporter there in the early 00s he had to keep a go bag packed because of mafia displeasure with *any* reporting.) Over time, a repaired Ukraine would be a brain drain and an indictment of rule-of-law-by-criminal-consensus. No sentimentality about "freedom" or "democracy" here: but Russians, even ordinary Russians, are likely to vote with their feet and have done so for decades, and Ukraine would probably be a far easier lift than trying to get into the UK or US.
Finally, you'd have to be a very special kind of stupid to occupy after the lessons of Afghanistan I, Iraq II, and Afghanistan II. I don't think he's stupid.
Excellent stuff, but where does the EU's Mutual Defence Clause (42.7 in the Lisbon Treaty) fit in this calculation? It make specific reference to the reliance on pre-existing NATO obligations of member states as "the foundation of their collective defence".
Not every EU State is also in NATO. So I think that is an issue but not as big of one.
Yes but do you believe a neutralised Ukraine, with membership in the EU, would be acceptable to Russia - bearing in mind this would mean Ukraine was a member of a defensive alliance which included 4 NATO members on Ukraine's Borders?
Great insight. Your "Zelensky Option" makes a lot of sense, but do you think Ukraine declaring it would not seek NATO membership would mean anything after this? The West would still undoubtedly start helping Ukraine arm itself to the point where it wouldn't be so overmatched if anything like this ever happened again.
I think the "promises" were always going to be variations of "worth little" and "worthless". Maintaining America's word, especially when delievered orally has not been a priority. Russia abstained on Libya in 2011 on the basis of a promise to avoid regime change and that reveled in Qadaffi's death.
That said, I think given the nature of what has taken place, Putin may well feel he has made his point. NATO membership for Ukraine is worth a war for Russia. The question now would be how much is Ukraine outside of NATO worth for the West. If the West's primary interest in Ukraine is the "Ukrainian people" then granting them EU membership, reconstruction funds and being willing to accept Russia's terms should be acceptable. If this was always about containing Russia, then the West will value keeping sanctions on Russia over Ukraine.
This is logical but the reason I advised caution is that while i think Putin 10 years ago almost certainly would have tried this track precisely because even if it fails the very failure would reveal Western "hypocrisy " I think he is long past having time for games. He will only pursue this if he wants it, and he believes it will work. I don't think he would invest heavily in an offer he has no interest in merely to prove a point. Things are a bit beyond that now
My guess is that Putin is going to break things, kill people, and withdraw. I suspect he'll settle for neutrality from that list.
As I've been telling people--rough analogy, but you meet people where they are--it's a little like Mexico joining the Warsaw Pact. The US would have real problems with this, primarily economic. Putin prefers Ukraine as a broken basket case. The issue with NATO is not NATO arms, but that NATO would clean Ukraine up--and the EU would put the cherry on top. If they could do this for Bulgaria, they could do it anywhere. (Yes, Bulgaria's terrible, but when my brother was a reporter there in the early 00s he had to keep a go bag packed because of mafia displeasure with *any* reporting.) Over time, a repaired Ukraine would be a brain drain and an indictment of rule-of-law-by-criminal-consensus. No sentimentality about "freedom" or "democracy" here: but Russians, even ordinary Russians, are likely to vote with their feet and have done so for decades, and Ukraine would probably be a far easier lift than trying to get into the UK or US.
Finally, you'd have to be a very special kind of stupid to occupy after the lessons of Afghanistan I, Iraq II, and Afghanistan II. I don't think he's stupid.