What I am Watching Internationally
This weekend saw quite a lot of action in Europe when it came to politics. While interesting stories happened elsewhere - Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte dropped out of the Vice Presidential race, current VP Leni Robredo, the effective opposition leader jumped into the presidential one - I feel that story should be covered when there is enough time and space to give it context.
By contrast, this weekend saw the fall of Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, the defeat of the coalition led by Prime Minister Babis in the Czech Republic, and the near collapse of the hopes of Germany’s Christian Democrats to hold onto power. On opposite sides of the continent, Britain and Poland both upped the ante in their challenges to Brussels, which makes the removal of Kurz and Babis all the more important. Both were obstacles to concerted action against London and Warsaw. Even if their replacements are non-entities, the vacuum will increase the relative influence of the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain which hold the balance between the confrontationist France, and previously accommodationist Germany.
Table of Contents
US Media Watch
Changes of Government
1. Austria
2. Czech Republic
3. Germany
Ongoing News
1. Brexit/Northern Ireland
2. Poland
US Media Watch
Polish President Andrej Duda made an appearance on Tucker Carlson’s primetime Fox News show where he defended the record of the Polish government on LGBT issues, and made an effort to draw a common thread between the agenda of the ruling Law and Justice Party and American Republicans. The Polish Government bet heavily on Donald Trump, even offering to name a military base after the former President in a bid to win the placement of US troops, and has struggle to adapt to the Biden Administration. Poland has always sought to act as bridge between Europe and America, but the PiS government, with a nostalgic attachment to the anti-Communist struggle of the 1980s, especially its strong social Catholic element, has shown an emotional desire to tie itself to a vision of America which has a different cultural model. Under the Trump Administration, where Secretary of State Pompeo made efforts to place religious liberty at the center of American rhetoric, the Poles found a partner in Washington willing to legitimize a model of freedom and democracy which included values such as being pro-life and “pro-family”. The problem is that left-leaning Americans and Democrats do not share this vision anymore than the Western Europeans with whom Warsaw has tussled, and the result is that the Biden team appear to have bought into the view that Poland is the problem in Warsaw’s disputes with Brussels. This has been demonstrated in escalating criticism over a proposed media law which would have required the US company Discovery to sell a majority stake in Poland’s largest remaining Television station, as well as in a dispute over Holocaust property legal changes which led Israel to withdraw its Ambassador.
Duda appears to be trying to make his case to an American audience which is likely to be sympathetic. Appearing on Tucker is unlikely to help with the Biden team. If anything, it may make them more hostile. But a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives signed letters warning Poland of a rupture in relations over Discovery, and Duda may believe that if he can reach Republican primary voters he can at least make Poland a partisan issue and peal away Republican support for Biden’s anti-Warsaw line.
Mike Pence recently spoke in Hungary as a guest of Prime Minister Orban. This continues Orban’s efforts to reach out to the American Republican establishment. Orban seems to have concluded that relations with American Democrats are beyond salvation, and to have bet on the ability of Republicans to obstruct the hostility of a Democratic administration, and back him when in office.
Major Governmental News
Austria: Chancellor Sebastian Kurz of the Center-Right Austrian People’s Party(OVP) resigned three days after corruption investigators raided his office. They are investigating allegations that Kurz, while Foreign Minister, bribed the fake pollster “Research Affairs” into producing results that made his boss and then OVP leader look like an electoral liability, with several showing the party at 18%, below all other results. Then when Kurz became party leader, it is alleged, these fabricated polls were used to show the OVP at a level of support that was artificially inflated.
Background: Al Capone was done-in on tax evasion, and Sebastian Kurz, one of Austria’s more colorful political figures, is ostensibly being taken down on polling fraud. Kurz, at 35, has transformed Austrian politics since he became Foreign Minister at 28. At the time, the OVP had been the junior partner in grand coalitions with the Socialists for two terms, and was polling in third place, behind the far-right Freedom Party. With the 2015 European migrant crisis in full swing, many expected the OVP to be swept away. Kurz, using a combination of charisma, and with ruthlessness of the sort alleged, seized control of his party, and then positioned it on the populist Right. When the OVP came first with 32% of the vote in 2017, Kurz formed an alliance with the far-right FPO, only to fire the FPO Ministers two years later following the release of recordings of FPO leader Hans Christian Strache meeting with Russian Oligarchs which may or may not have leaked from the Austrian intelligence services, Kurz fired Strache and the FPO Ministers and forced an early election, increasing the OVP’s vote share to 38%. Kurz then formed an alliance with the Greens, producing a government which was among the most committed in Europe to fighting climate change and embracing Green energy, but otherwise allowed the OVP, and Kurz, for whom the party was increasingly a personal vehicle, to what it wished on everything else. Allegations of corruption in contracting have swirled around the Chancellor’s Office, and earlier this year Kurz, in a bizarre press conference, accused the Austrian Judiciary of harming his mother by investigating him.
What Happened?: Kurz’s resignation is less than it seems. He remains the leader of the OVP, and its group leader in Parliament. The OVP-Green government remains in office under a caretaker Chancellor. The outcome of this “crisis” can best be described as a draw. Kurz clearly initially wished to ride this one out, refusing to resign initially following the raid, and only giving in two days later. This was likely due to the behavior of the FPO. Kurz may have been counting on cooperation between the far-right FPO and the Socialists, Greens, and libertarian NEOS party being impossible, and therefore assumed that if the Greens left, he would be able to hang on with FPO support. The FPO, however, perhaps still bitter over their treatment by Kurz in 2019, appear to have announced they would abstain.
While the FPO abstaining had the potential to topple Kurz, it would not have been enough for a Green/Socialist/Neos government as the lineup below shows
The Greens/Socialists/NEOS would have had enough votes to oust Kurz 81-71, but without the active support of the FPO, they would have been 21 seats short of a majority. The result of a no-confidence vote would have been the appointment of a caretaker government by the Green President Alexander Van Der Bellen and new elections.
The caretaker option was bad for everyone. Polls show the Greens losing from new elections, and indicate that they would create a situation where the only viable governments would be a grand coalition of the OVP/Socialists, or another rightwing OVP/FPO coalition, either of which would cost the Greens their influence and hard won environmental policies.
As for Kurz, President Van Der Bellen is a personal enemy, and while the OVP might well survive an early election, Kurz himself might not, especially if the interim government threw all of its resources into investigating and prosecuting Kurz.
Due to these factors, the Greens and Kurz both concluded that the best option was for the current government to continue, with Kurz temporarily leaving office.
What Happens Next?: Kurz remains the leader of the largest party both in parliament and government. If polls continue to show the OVP position to be stable or even strengthening, it seems likely Kurz will find a pretext to resume the Chancellorship in the next six to nine months. If, however, they indicate the public is turning on him, this retirement may become permanent. And if they show the possibility of a Green/Socialist/NEOS majority, it is likely the Greens will pull the plug.
What does this mean for Europe?: While far from an Orban, Kurz was probably the best friend the Eastern European populist leaders had. With Merkel’s departure, Kurz’s resignation, and the defeat of Andrej Babis in the Czech Republic, the positions of Hungary and Poland are substantially more isolated than they were six weeks ago.
Czech Elections: The Czech Republic held elections on October 8-9th 2021. It appears that Prime Minister Andrej Babis, an eccentric billionaire who heads the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens(ANO) party will not be returning to office. His party won 72/200 seats, compared with 71 for the opposition SPOU coalition of center-right opposition parties, and 27 for a center-left opposition list. While the total of 72 is only 6 seats down on ANO’s previous result, Babis’ allies on the left in the Czech Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia were wiped out, losing their 30 seats. That left the only possible support for Babis the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy(SPO) led by the eccentric Japanese-Czech politician Tomio Okamura.
What Happened?: Babis and many media observers blamed the defeat on last minute revelations in the “Pandora Papers” that Babis setup an overseas company to buy a $13 million chateau on the French Riviera. While likely unhelpful given the closeness of the result, the actual decisive factor was the failure of the Social Democrats and Communists to reach the 5% threshold. Parties supporting or tolerating Babis won around 46% of the vote compared with 44% for the opposition. But the opposition won 54% of the seats because of the elimination of the Marxist parties
What seems to have doomed Babis is association with Orban and the current Polish and Slovene governments. While Babis himself is far less conservative, especially on social issues than either Orban, Slovene Prime Minister Jansa, or the current Polish government, he is widely associated with them within the European Union as a populist Eastern European strongman. This association seems to have been fatal for the Social Democrats and Communists’ whose voters ignored policy-concessions in favor of “punishing them” for the betrayal of supporting a “populist” government.
This trend was most apparent in Prague, where the center-right and centrist opposition coalitions won 40% and 23% respectively compared to a mere 4% for the Socialists, and 2% for the Communists. The two parties won 14% and 9% in 2013 and 8% and 6% in 2017.
The results provide evidence that “younger and urban” leftwing voters increasingly value “cultural liberalism” and association with entities or concepts they identify with it(same sex-marriage/the EU – both major issues) as more important than bread and butter policies relating to benefits. While already seen in Canada, it has become striking in Eastern Europe both in the 2019 Hungarian local elections, when left-leaning voters were willing to unite behind the formerly openly fascist Jobbik to defeat Fidesz, and in Poland’s 2020 Presidential election.
What does this mean for Europe?: Babis’ defeat is far less substantial than it is made out to be. He was always a much more cosmopolitan figure than Orban, or Kaczynski in Poland. Whereas both Fidesz and Law and Justice, the ruling party in Warsaw have ideological differences with the EU – on abortion, on gay rights, on climate change – Babis’ disputes were almost all transactional. He resisted efforts by the EU to dictate to the Czech Republic in general, not because he was opposed to particular values. The unstable nature of his Old Left-Right coalition illustrated this, and contributed to its downfall.
The new Czech government is united not by ideology but by culture. It includes the traditional party of the center-right, the Civic Democrats, the pro-European “Yuppie” party TOP 09 of former Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, along with the Pirate Party, Christian Democrats, and Independents and Mayors. The major unifying factor is that they are “liberal” identify with “Europe”, and if they do not share “woke” views in an American context, they will advance them if it means being “western”. Same-Sex marriage, which narrowly stalled in the National Assembly last term is almost certain to pass.
Support for Brussels in its showdowns with Poland/Hungary/Slovenia is likely to be the only other major unifying factor for the new ruling coalition as it functions as a continuation of the struggle against Babis.
Germany: Germany took another step towards a Chancellor Olaf Scholz, albeit it was a step taken by the formerly ruling Christian Democrats. There was outrage after details of the meeting between the Free Democrats and Christian Democrats leaked to the press. The following day, the Green Party all but broke off talks with the Christian Democrats after details of a meeting between those two parties leaked to the same Bild newspaper. “"How is a party supposed to provide for a stable government if it doesn't even manage to conduct trustful and discreet talks?" asked Jamila Schafer, the deputy Green leader. While it was speculated that the leak may have originated from elements within the CDU/CSU opposed to current leader Armin Laschet forming a government, with additional leaks pointing the finger at rival and Christian Social Union leader Markus Soder, it may well be that this provides an excuse for everyone involved to avoid a formation they did not truly want.
What Happened?: The media has described the outcome of the German elections as inconclusive. That is accurate only to an extent. The elections eliminated several options mathematically, while rendering even more impractical
A coalition between the Linke(Left), Socialists(SPD), and Greens, “Red-Red-Green” failed to achieve a majority, as did a center-right coalition between the Free Democrats and Christian Democrats. As a result, given the need for at least one of the two major parties to take part, there are only three choices of government and two Chancellors.
Grand Coalition 3.0 between the SPD/CDU this time with the SPD in charge and its leader Olaf Scholz as Chancellor
SPD/FDP/Green also under Olaf Scholz
CDU/FDP/Green
The last option was the only one where the CDU remained in office, and evidence is that no one was particularly interested, except for Armin Laschet, the CDU Chancellor candidate who will almost certainly be removed if he does not become Chancellor. But it is precisely for that reason, and because he led his party to its worst ever result that many others in the party wish to go into opposition and find either the first or third options above nightmarish.
The FDP/Greens also likely have little interest, but they need to pretend to be seriously pursuing the CDU/Laschet option in order to have leverage with Scholz and Social Democrats for the second option. Hence the need to pretend to take it seriously. The farcical nature of the talks was the result of the simultaneous needs of the parties. The FDP/Greens needed the talks to be seen as serious with a chance of succeeding and resented anything which undermined that impression. Laschet desperately wanted them to succeed. And Laschet’s rivals in the CDU and CSU needed to ensure they didn’t succeed.
What does it mean? – It means that the course of events remains what it has been since election day and arguably before. Merkel will remain as caretaker Chancellor until Scholz reaches a deal with either the FDP/Greens or CDU on the formation of a new government. Both the CDU/SPD dearly hope it will be the former option, albeit for different reasons, but it is those very reasons which ensure there is a chance that both the FDP and Greens may walk away knowing they can force yet another grand coalition if needed.
Europe, Polexit, and a Path out of Northern Ireland
The preceding week saw developments in two major international disputes which have been dominating the concerns of European policy-makers, and those American officials charged with developing a European policy. Well, the ones who have been confirmed in their jobs and not held up by Senator Ted Cruz. More on that in a minute.
At the Conservative party conference, Lord David Frost, the Brexit Minister, indicated that he had given the European Union 10 days to respond to the latest British proposals regarding the protocol governing Northern Ireland’s trade with the EU(in this case the Republic of Ireland) and the rest of the UK. He directly held out the prospect of invoking Article 16 of the Brexit Exit Agreement, which allows either side to unilaterally suspend elements of the protocol if needed, while permitting the other to retaliate through tariffs and measures of their own provided they are “proportionate.” Frost promised a “robust response” to any effort by the EU to utilize this clause.
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruled that “The EU Treaty is subordinate to the constitution in the Polish legal system ... and, like any part of the Polish legal system, it must comply with the constitution." The 11-2 ruling, which led to claims it represented the prospect of a “legal Polexit” or in the minds of some even a real one, was the latest escalation in a series of disputes that began when the Polish government chose to reorganize its judiciary, in effect adopting the “court packing” plan favored by many American liberals, and the European Union argued such actions violated “Rule of Law” requirements Poland committed to when it joined the Union. The situation is far more ambiguous than it appears from the coverage. The provisions in question deal with the independence of the Judiciary, not with alterations to its structure, and therefore the EU complaint is predicated on proving that the intention behind the changes was to violate the independence of the judiciary, and thereby violate EU law. One reason the EU has generally conducted its disputes with Poland on the political rather than legal field is precisely because of the dubious legal ground on which it stands. Yet if the EU’s legal ground is murky, the ability and determination to do something about what it sees as a disruptive element in the form of the current Polish Government is crystal clear. The European Union is currently holding up the disbursement of Covid Reconstruction funds, something which must be made even more tempting by the embarrassment this causes a government which has bet a recovery from its dire poll ratings on a Polish “New Deal” using that money. If the Polish government will use creative constructions of the preamble to its Constitution to sidestep EU demands, the EU will use the pretext of Polish defiance to try and undermine a ruling political party it does not like in Warsaw. Odds are that the money would not have been released if the ruling had gone the other way.