Apologies for the lack of updates. I have been traveling extensively, and other work commitments have intruded. I am hoping to update this more regularly going forward.
First of all welcome to any new readers who saw my interview with Ian Leslie. I am honored by his decision to speak with me on Ukraine. He flatters me a bit in calling me a specific expert on it. My actual Phd Dissertation was on Croatia’s role in the breakup of Yugoslavia, and in particular how the government of Franjo Tudjman “won” that war. While not directly addressing the Ukraine, there are significant similarities not just between the breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia, but also between the military and political culture of Serbia and Russia. Furthermore, the way the war developed in 1991, between the mechanized Yugoslav People’s Army, the fourth largest in Europe, and the secessionist republics had tactical similarities, not least because despite repeated “reforms” and “modernizations” the principals and ethos of the Soviet military tradition carries on just as the Russian imperial tradition did into the Red Army.
There were also historic similarities between the regional roles played by Serbia and Russia. In particular, both have never been part of the Western club. They have occasionally been part of wider federations or super states whose members have been accepted into the West both before and after(Croatia, Slovenia, the Baltics) but the door has never been open for them. Hence a tendency to view defections(Ukraine, Montenegro) as betrayals. This was not a creation of Milosevic, nor is it a product of Putin’s propaganda. It was a legitimate interpretation of events from a Russian or Serb perspective which failed to take into account why it kept happening. Why did the Croats and Slovenes always “chose” the Germans? Why did the Poles, Balts, and now the Ukrainians? The easiest answer was ignore self-reflection and blame the West. The commander of the Yugoslav Army, Veljiko Kadijevic believed in an American conspiracy to eliminate Yugoslavia so as to dominate the region. This would have made the Croats and Slovenes dupes, though when they resisted they became Ustase(the Nazi collaborationist regime which had ruled Croatia during WWII), much as Ukraine’s Pro-Western stance was the not the result of popular preference but an “American coup” against the elected President in 2014, a message which again coexisted with the idea that those who resisted Russia were Nazis.
These are not mere lines of propaganda. If they were, they would be accompanied by a realistic policy. Rather they were convictions held all the way to the top, albeit for different reasons. Accepting that Ukrainians or Croats viewed Russia or Serbia as beneath them would be insulting to the average person. For a leader like Putin, it was an indictment of the Russia he built.
It is of course possible to take analogies too far. But it hardly surprises me that the political lines have more or less taken on the same shape they did in the 1990s. Because it is a very similar conflict.
US policy in both cases was far more ambivalent than it is accused of being, with doubts as to whether the conflicts were in American interests. Ultimately, however, there was never any doubt that if they developed which side the United States would be on, and the experience of the Bush Adminstration, the one time American leaders tried to even half-heartedly resist such a tide, illustrate why it has been insurmountable .
There were deep divisions within the Bush Administration at the time both over whether the US should welcome a breakup of the USSR, or even if it had the ability to influence events. I am a realist, and by that I mean something different from Mearsheimer. They focus on what states should have done or do. As someone who had exposure to actual policymaking, I cannot be naïve enough to see the world in that way. The relevant question for the diplomatic historian, as it should be for the policy-maker, is what could have been done. In the case of 1991, there were plenty of things that might have been good ideas, but realistically they were never on the table and never could have been on the table due to domestic political pressure. As I wrote:
Was that a mistake? A mistake implies agency and alternatives. The United States as an entity might have had agency. But George H. W Bush did not. He had tried to exercise it on August 1st, 1991 when in his infamous “Chicken Kiev” speech he had declared “"Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred." He was lambasted at home, ignored in Ukraine, and ultimately the Russian government under Yeltsin lost interest. What, precisely, would the Realists have had him do?
As I made clear in my discourse with Ian, that is the question which has to be posed to those who argue the Russian invasion could have been avoided by mere paper promises that Ukraine would not join NATO. As I explained:
What precisely would an agreement on the “neutralization” of Ukraine have looked like? If a US President offered to block Ukraine’s ascension to NATO, the move would be rejected domestically. There is next to no chance the Senate would have ratified this in treaty form, and even if by some chance it did, it would not bind a future President or Senate from tearing it up. Furthermore, the opposing party would immediately denounce the agreement and pledge to reverse it. As the primary impact of “eliminating the option” would not be to keep Ukraine out of NATO, but to instill fear of Russia in Ukrainians, the appearance of US Senators and Congressmen in Kyiv the following week pledging support for Ukraine’s ascension would greatly undermine the value of any such agreement.
Furthermore, rather than decreasing tensions, it almost certainly would have raised them. As the only mechanism for Russian influence in Ukraine is fear, and the purpose of an agreement on “neutralization” would be to restore fear of Russia in Kyiv, in order to “cash the cheque” of any such deal Russia would have to immediately move to threaten Ukraine militarily. That would have further undermined the political position of any Western leaders who had supported any “deal” with Moscow and promoted its rapid unraveling.
I am not an absolute historical determinist. I believe that contingency matters, and people matter. Choices do exist. But those choices tend to be about to respond to problems which are inherent to the nature of the world and the international system, not a chance to wish it out of existence.
I hope to provide that perspective with my writings here as well as on RealClearPolitics, AMAC, and previously on my own site.