The Context of an Ideologically Confused Tory Leadership Campaign Part 1: Process and Factions
(Apologies if there are any typographical errors. I caught Covid last Friday, despite 3 shots of Moderna, and that may have effected the rigor of my editing. I am less sure what the excuse is for the campaigns misspelling the word “campaign” or the names of MPs endorsing them is.)
I have tried to begin writing a rundown of my thoughts on the Conservative leadership contest several times over the last few days. Each time, I struggle to compress the dynamics into the format of a traditional article, and by the time I had a thousand or so words written, events had already overtaken my observations. I then decided it made much more sense to abandon the article format altogether in favor of the bullet-point approach I adopted with regards to my thoughts on the Ukraine back in March. I am not going to try and provide an all encompassing picture for a lay reader, but I hope my observations will nevertheless be of use.
The Rules and Process
I consider it completely unimportant who in the party will vote, or how; but what is extraordinarily important is this—who will count the votes, and how. - Ascribed to Joseph Stalin by his former personal secretary
The Conservative party has struggled with leadership selection for two centuries. In the 19th century, the party elected separate leaders in the Commons and the Lords, and following the death of Disraeli it was decided to leave it up to Queen Victoria whether to chose Lord Salisbury, the leader in the Lords, or Sir Stafford Northcote, the leader in the Commons. As a mix between a political party and a private club, the leadership process remained opaque and informal until 1963 when anger over an article by a former Minister alleging that a “Magic Circle” had chosen Alec Douglas-Home as leader against the will of a majority of the party led to the choice being given to MPs. This remained the system until after the 1997 election when the current method was introduced.
MPs nominate candidates
All candidates who meet a minimal threshold qualify for the first round.
MPs vote two to three times a week eliminating the bottom performing candidate each time as well as those who do not meet a threshold
When only two remain, their names are presented to the party membership. Membership is relatively small. Less than 150,000 votes tend to be cast. The membership decides between the final two candidates.
That is the system. It has worked differently in practice. In 2016, no membership vote was held, as Andrea Leadsom dropped out, allowing Theresa May to become PM uncontested. There is also a history of skullduggery. Leading candidates with a surplus of MPs, have been accused of instructing their supporters to vote strategically in order to try and maneuver their weakest possible opponents into the final vote.
The Context
The current contest for the leadership of the Conservative party is taking place in the shadow of the fall of Boris Johnson. Always a controversial figure, he begs for what AJP said Neville Chamberlain always deserved in a biographer. Not someone sympathetic, but rather someone who would try to understand him. Johnson has been the victim of repeated attempts to pigeon-hole him either ideologically or into some sort of comparative analysis of a wider populist revolt in the Western world. I wrote an article last week giving my own views on the topic, but suffice to say that the image of the Eton-educated former London mayor as some sort of right-wing populist is and always has been laughable. Johnson is without a doubt a figure with populist appeal, but that comes from his contempt for norms. That contempt allowed him to reject shibboleths of both Right and Left on a range of policy issues, providing him with electoral appeal. It also, ultimately, led him to treat the management of government with the same lack of care or respect for others that defined his personal affairs. That he fell over his indifference to sexual misconduct he himself had not partaken in is somewhat fitting of why he became so popular so fast. It was not a revolt against his policies by the electorate which turfed him out. It was a revolt by the electorate against his indifference to government.
This is key to understanding why the Conservative leadership contest is so confused ideologically. In 2005, 2016, and 2019 there were clear ideological messages in the fall of the preceding leader. David Cameron ran for leader following three general election defeats seeking a mandate to do whatever was needed for the party to return to government. In 2016, David Cameron resigned the moment it became clear that the majority of the Conservative electorate was no longer willing to tolerate the policies he felt neccisary for him to remain. While there is debate over whether Cameron should have resigned immediately following the referendum vote, or presided over the Brexit process, the fact was he rightly interpreted the vote as a rejection of his style of government and it was impossible for him to remain in office one day longer as David Cameron. The question then was not whether the party would move to the Right on Brexit but how far. The same question was posed in 2019. Theresa May had fallen because her approach to Brexit, trying to please all sides by seeking a deal with the EU which would carry-out Brexit while limiting the changes to the status quo to every important stakeholder had created a situation in which both Brexit and the Conservative party were under mortal danger. While about a dozen MPs toyed with dropping Brexit, virtually the entire party concluded that it had to be prioritized over all else, and therefore the next leader would be whoever would carry it out.
Boris, however, did not fall for ideological reasons. As a result, different groups are free to write ideological messages into a process without them. Boris fell, so says Lord David Frost, because he did not push Brexit hard-enough and locked down too hard. Others say he fell because he delayed locked-downs and let the bodies pile high. He either did not cut taxes enough, or he flooded the economy with money during Covid19, causing an inflationary crisis.
The factional infighting, on full display at the first debate on Friday, is a direct product of the fact that different factions are able to come up with different explanations for what is wrong with the situation.
Loosely, they can be defined as
New Right: Kemi Badenoch, Liz Truss, Sualla Braverman, (Boris Johnson came to power with their support but was never one) -
This group believes that the Conservative party failed to build on the populist principles that powered Brexit and the 2019 victory. When it comes to Brexit, they think it is not that “Red Wall” voters who left Labour in 2019 were actually voting against Jeremy Corbyn or only to get it done and are now returning to Labour for economic reasons, but rather, because the Tories have stopped talking about Brexit, the issue has faded. They believe if they stage further confrontations with the EU, for instance over Northern Ireland, it will cause a “rally-round the flag” effect. They can then accuse their opponents of wishing to sell-out to the EU.
When it comes to economics they believe in tax-cuts today, and worrying about debt tomorrow.
They fully buy-into the potency of “culture wars” issues when it comes to things like Trans rights and education and blame the influence of Boris Johnson’s wife Carrie for neutering any efforts by the current government to exploit these issues.
It should be noted that unlike in the US where despite accusations thrown at the Koch Brothers(whose influence has largely collapsed in the face of a genuine populist reaction) being used by the center and left to ignore a genuine grassroots insurgency, in the UK “populism” has generally been a very elite, London-based affair. It is heavily linked to a network of Think Tanks, most prominently Policy Exchange, media outlets(most recently GB News but also the Telegraph and Mail) and researchers. This is not to say there are not voters who share these views. But a figure like Liz Truss is the product of the London Think Tank world just as Nigel Farage is the product of the London media circuit. They have little grassroots influence outside London which is why even with the removal of many anti-Brexit MPs between 2016 and 2020, this group utterly failed to dominate the new intake. If anything, the “Red Wall” MPs this group claims to speak for are more hostile to this faction than the party at large. In Britain, the “Populists” are generally the most London-centric, if not the most economically or socially elite.
Old Tories - Penny Mordaunt, Jeremy Hunt(Before elimination), Theresa May(before becoming PM)
The difference between the “Right Populists” and “Old Tories” is that while the former represent the media and intellectual voice of “Conservatism” in the capital, the Old Tories tend to represent it in the small towns.
Whereas the populists favor lower taxes for ideological or principled reasons, the Old Tories prioritize social and economic stability and therefore are inclined to concern themselves with inflation. Populists might be fine with starving the beasts, Old Tories tend to not want to become food for a hungry beast.
Old Tories tend to be distrustful of social activists of all kinds. That means they intensely dislike wokeness unless it is dressed up in a suit and Tory politics, hence why they could eventually accept same-sex marriage. While they dislike the “culture war” waged by the Left, they are also inclined to see Right-wing culture warriors as equally at fault. Hence US pro-life activists post-Dobbs are viewed with the same contempt if not greater than that reserved for BLM activists.
The largest gap with the Right-Populists tends to come in the attitude to the United States in general, and Republicans in particular. Whereas the Right Populists see both as an example, the Old Tories tend to view it as an unstable actor out for its own interests, unreliable in the long-run. They are more likely to view the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a mistake, and while they absolutely support Ukraine, and are angry over the treatment of Hong Kong, they do not believe America’s causes, much less defense of some international order, is Britain’s primary duty.
They tend to reflect the views and concerns of the British middle and upper class outside of London and of the British middle class within the capital.
Cameroon Technocrats - Rishi Sunak, David Cameron(former PM), Boris Johnson(rogue member)
Cameroonism is now associated both with Remainism and Wokism today but that badly misunderstands the phenomena. At its root, the Cameron-Osborne project represented government by technocracy. The Treasury under Osborne sold austerity as the project not of a political party, but the product of “science.” The economic policies were not moral, but simply correct. Criticism was by definition evidence of critics valuing ideology above actual economic science.
So too it was with social policy. David Cameron had once voted against ending Section 28 which prohibited Same-Sex relationships being discussed in schools. His shift to support for Same-Sex marriage was justified on a technocratic basis. It would lead to positive legal and social outcomes, and there was no good technocratic argument against it. Opposition was by definition ideological and irrational.
It was this approach, more than any ideological positioning which provoked the great populist revolts of Cameron’s tenure. The SNP was saved in the aftermath of the Scottish Independence Referendum in large part by the sheer patronizing nature of Cameron’s response in which the defeat was a vindication of his own personal approach, and not the result of the hard-work or sacrifices of others. Much of the toxicity of the EU referendum campaign was a consequence of a Remain campaign whose contempt for the Leave arguments or any voters who were attracted by them was a pure reflection of the Prime Minister and his Chancellor. I wrote a piece at the time outlining that while I was nonetheless reluctantly supporting Remain because I did not believe Brexit would work in practice, I was nevertheless strongly tempted to support Leave in sheer revulsion against the patronizing arrogance of the Cameroon Remain campaign.
This context is important to understand why Rishi Sunak can be so polished in debates, so effective as a campaigner, and yet nevertheless be so toxic among the membership. The issues have shifted, and so Rishi Sunak who backed Leave is now the Cameroon-candidate, not because of his specific issue positions but because of what he represents and his approach to government.
Tory Members and MPs fully believe Rishi can run a government. Voters probably believe so too. But Rishi will never let them forget that he knows it.
Boris Johnson was too uncouth to be a member in good standing, but by upbringing, background, policy, and arrogance he was fully a member. He entered Parliament in the same intake as Cameron, was a technocratic governor of London for eight years before returning to Parliament, and his approach to Covid demonstrated his deference to expertise, especially in the hands of unelected professionals, over the concerns of voters or MPs. That his personal life was a mess, and he was lazy should not exclude him from this clique. The irony is that his political support came from the Populist Right, and much of the instability of the government derived from this contradiction.
Wets - Tom Tugendhat, Rory Stewart(2019)
The Wets, not the Cameroons represent the Tory left. Unlike the Cameroons or Old Tories, but like the “Right Populists” they have never truly been in power themselves. They may have come closest under Harold Macmillan, but that was more the instance of a place an time where the concerns of Old Tories coincided with the desires of the Wets. Similarly, Winston Churchill developed an anti-appeasement following with figures such as the “Red Duchess” of Athol and other supporters of the Spanish Republic but Churchill was not one of them, and they were not carried to power with him.
Generally representing a tradition of noblesse oblige, it is dominated by those who believe the Conservative party has a duty to put the wider interests of society above those of its own voters or members. They occasionally hold Ministerial office, especially under Old Tories such as Macmillan and May(the Cameroons often find them weird), but they tend to bow out quickly in leadership contests after making a principal case why everyone else is dishonest demagogues.
Rory Stewart filled that role in 2019, albeit he was odd even by the Wet standard. This year it is Tom Tugendhat, the chair of the Commons Foriegn Affairs Select Committee who had been deeply critical of governmental policy during the withdrawal from Afghanistan, especially accusations that the Prime Minister(or his wife) prioritized the evacuation of animals over that of Afghans whose lives were at risk from the Taliban.
Free from the need to run a united party if he wins, Tugendhat was able to make among the best impressions at Friday’s debate. The problem is he has few sources for additional votes and is likely to go out on Monday. At which point the question becomes whether he backs Sunak or Mordaunt.
Factional Complexity: The Personal Factor
In theory, the vote counts in the first two rounds should give some idea of the relative strength of factions. In practice, candidates are human and that influences where support goes. For instance, Elizabeth Truss represents the continuity of Boris Johnson’s government, if not Johnson himself. Her operation is incredibly top-heavy with political figures whose prominence and governmental roles are solely a product of Brexit, including Nadine Dories the Culture Secretary, Lord David Frost, the former Brexit Negotiator, and Jacob Rees-Mogg, the Brexit Opportunities Minister. This creates a tension with younger right-wing MPs whose path to advancement would be blocked by the presence of these individuals in Ministerial office, and almost certain need of a victorious Truss to reconcile other factions of the party. The same is true of Rishi Sunak. On the other-hand, Mordaunt has a much more open field of jobs. The result was evident over the first two ballots and is likely to continue to be so. Despite the eliminated candidates endorsing either Rishi Sunak(Jeremy Hunt), or Liz Truss, and Truss receiving almost all the high profile endorsements both gained fewer votes than Mordaunt.
Round One
Rishi Sunak 88
Penny Mordaunt 67
Liz Truss 50
Kemi Badenoch 40
Tom Tugendhat 37
Suella Braverman 32
Nadhim Zahawi 25
Jeremy Hunt 18
Round 2
Rishi Sunak 101
Penny Mordaunt 83
Liz Truss 64
Kemi Badenoch 49
Tom Tugendhat 32
Suella Braverman 27
Braverman has now endorsed Truss, but reports are that only about half her MPs are expected to follow. The assumption is that the final round will feature Sunak facing either Mordaunt, the candidate of the “Old Tories” or Truss representing the “Populist Right”. On paper, as many commentators are quick to note, Mordaunt should run out of MPs to pickup first. 140 MPs backed one of Braverman, Truss or Badenoch. Tudgendhat is assumed to be ideologically closer to Sunak. And Sunak is likely to prefer to favor Truss.
But as hinted there are several factors at play
Mordaunt is seen as the highest upside as a general election candidate. While there is definitely risk, she physically looks the part, and comes from the center of the party. She would represent a fresh start precisely because she did not hold a senior role under Johnson or take part in infighting. In turn, there is evidence the membership sees this and backs her as a consequence.
Liz Truss is a highly problematic candidate for the right. A Liberal Democrat who called for abolishing the monarchy at Oxford she was outspoken against Leaving the EU. This is not seen as a problem by the “Populist Right” clique in London, but the reason it is not is because they view her as weak and malleable. But while being seen as malleable might win over Jacob Rees-Mogg, Lord Frost, or Steve Baker, being perceived as malleable by those three is as likely to turn off MPs who see them as a negative influence.
Truss is also perceived as a weak general election candidate. This is not merely because of current perceptions of her which are the worst of any Tory candidate. It is because she is a poor media performer, something reinforced at the Friday debate where a mere 6% felt she won, and only 3% felt she was the most charismatic. Fairly or not, she is perceived as personally unlikable by voters.
A key role is likely to be played by Kemi Badenoch. The surprise breakout star of the process, Kemi was largely known for culture war issues. If she goes out, she has serious choices to make about her future. It is taken for granted in “Populist Right” circles she will automatically endorse Truss but it is hard to see what is in it for her. An endorsement of Sunak would of course destroy her new-found credibility, but there is no guarantee that even with her endorsement Truss will make it into the top 2. Many of Kemi’s MP backers clearly do not like Truss personally and will defect. Kemi endorsing Truss will simply provide Truss with MPs she thinks she deserves. By contrast, an endorsement of Mordaunt would potentially make Kemi a kingmaker. While she has clashed with Mordaunt over Trans issues, taking credit for extracting a pledge to give her control over culture affairs(there is little chance Mordaunt will have much interest in appeasing the woke before a 2024 election anyway) would allow her to take credit for the policy shift.