The Biden Administration's Changing Rhetoric on Ukraine
A policy-shift is constrained by need to insist to everyone concerned that no policy-shift has taken place or is being contemplated
Summary
It appears increasingly apparent that the Biden Administration is not comfortable with the current dynamics of the war. They seem to fear the Ukrainian forces are suffering unacceptable losses in the East, and seem to want them to focus less on offensives elsewhere and pull back to more defensible lines. They may feel that the volume and nature of US aid cannot be effectively utilized with these levels of losses.
The Biden Administration also seems to have lost faith in the prospect of sanctions or a military collapse toppling Putin’s government. As a consequence, they seem to accept that any end to the fighting is likely to involve some form of agreement with Putin’s government. This will almost certainly involve something Putin can sell as a victory, which effectively rules out anything which may look like a defeat such as Putin conceding territory he held prior to February 24th.
The Biden Administration also seems unhappy with the way sanctions have performed. This is evident both from admissions they did not expect to be faced with global food inflation(or the diplomatic trap Russia has created by offering corridors for the export of grain conditional of course on recognizing the legality of Russia’s military presence), and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s complaint that the US is paying to maintain seized Russian Yachts. The admission displays both a lack of foresight about the administration of the policy, and a shocking sense of impotence to do anything to address it.
While the Administration is willing to admit all of these things - that sanctions are not working, that they are skeptical of the Ukrainian military situation, terrified of Ukraine’s losses, and believe negotiations at some point are needed - they are not willing to explicitly announce a new policy to reconcile them. The result is policy “hints” by way of leaks.
Macron’s much maligned efforts, both in terms of his phone-calls with Zelensky and visit to Kyiv, seem to better reflect the actual desires of US policy than the official position. Yet with only inferred support through leaks, it is unlikely Macron will succeed in convincing Zelensky that Biden desires something different than stated policy, much less in a way which gives Zelensky cover to conform.
The most likely result will be a blame game of escalating discontent with Ukraine emanating from the Administration to the media, combined with ever more vigorous denials policy has changed(illustrated by announcement of weapons shipments). The hope will be that the battlefield situation will develop into a sustainable stalemate without the need for further intervention.
Biden and the US Message
Last weekend I suggested that we were witnessing a shift in the Biden' Administration’s messaging regarding Ukraine. Starting with briefings by “US Intelligence Officials” to the New York Times and other outlets that the Ukrainian military situation was not only worse than perceived but that a refusal to be forthcoming with Washington about its own losses or needs was hindering aid more than indecision in DC, it also involved peevish remarks by the President at a fundraiser last weekend that Zelensky had ignored American warnings pre-invasion. This past week, General Milley responded to suggestions the US had not delivered enough aid to Ukraine by providing a detailed inventory of weapon systems to argue that the US transfers had exceeded Ukrainian requests. That these numbers, delivered orally by Milley, were rapidly made available to the press on PowerPoint, indicates the messaging was pre-planned. An impression reinforced by how readily the numbers and talking-points were repeated by former military talking heads in the media.
The veracity of these numbers is beside the point. They are almost certainly accurate. There would be nothing to gain from fabricating them, and it would be easy to prove. Whether they actually exceed Ukraine’s requests depends on the question of “which requests” and “when.” The relevant question in any case remains whether they meet Ukraine’s needs. What we really have then is not a disagreement between Washington and Kyiv about whether the US has fulfilled its promises to meet Ukraine’s needs, but what those needs are. Does Ukraine need to be able to hold Russia off, and defend what Kyiv currently holds? Drive the Russians back to the February 24th frontlines? Or go further and expel them from the Donbas or even the Crimea.
US rhetoric has been incongruent with US actions. The issue is not that concerns about escalation are unjustified as reasons to limit the shipment of strategic weapons to Ukraine which could hit targets within Russia, or more advanced equipment. Those are reasonable concerns. The problem is, that if concern over escalation is that great, it is an argument for ensuring Ukraine can defend what it holds, but accepting that it is too risky to try and retake the Crimea and Donbass.
That is not, however, what US rhetoric has been. US officials have suggested they are committed to Ukraine “winning” the war, and they have furthermore indicated their opposition to suggestions Ukraine should be pressured to accept anything less than maximalist claims.
Either of these policies might be defensible. But US officials have been urging Ukraine to pursue the second, while only providing aid sufficient to achieve the first, and to add to geopolitical resentment, attacking France and other states for daring to suggest that the arguments for limiting the supply of offensive weapons are simultaneously arguments for more limited war aims.
There is evidence that Joe Biden has awakened to this contradiction at the heart of American policy. Confirming suspicions I aired last weekend, NBC has reported that Biden was angered when US officials said the US wanted Ukraine to “win” and pressured Defense Secretary Austin and other officials to tone-down Pro-Ukrainian remarks.
Biden thought the secretaries had gone too far, according to multiple administration officials familiar with the call. On the previously unreported conference call, as Austin flew to Germany and Blinken to Washington, the president expressed concern that the comments could set unrealistic expectations and increase the risk of the U.S. getting into a direct conflict with Russia. He told them to tone it down, said the officials.
“Biden was not happy when Blinken and Austin talked about winning in Ukraine,” one of them said. “He was not happy with the rhetoric.”
Again, the relationship of the reports in this story to reality have to be seen in the context that the sources who briefed it wanted the media to report the story. As to why, we see almost the exact same framing as was present in the New York Times piece.
The secretaries explained that Austin’s comments had been misconstrued, another senior administration official said. But the displeasure Biden initially conveyed during that phone call, the officials said, reflected his administration’s belief that despite Ukrainian forces’ unexpected successes early on, the war would ultimately head in the direction it is now in two months later: a protracted conflict in which Russia continues to make small and steady advances.
U.S. officials are increasingly concerned that the trajectory of the war in Ukraine is untenable and are quietly discussing whether President Volodymyr Zelenskyy should temper his hard-line public position that no territory will ever be ceded to Russia as part of an agreement to end the war, according to seven current U.S. officials, former U.S. officials and European officials.
What is perhaps even more interesting is that this blunt assessment of the situation and statement of motives for leaking the story is then followed by an effort to dial it back in almost the exact same words as appeared in the Times. Let’s compare the two. Here is NBC’s version from June 17th.
Some officials want Zelenskyy to “dial it back a little bit,” as one of them put it, when it comes to telegraphing his red lines on ending the war. But the issue is fraught given that Biden is adamant about the U.S. not pressuring the Ukrainians to take steps one way or another. His administration’s position has been that any decision about how and on what terms to end the war is for Ukraine to decide.
“We are not pressuring them to make concessions, as some Europeans are. We would never ask them to cede territory,” one U.S. official said. “We are planning for a long war. We intend to prepare the American people for that, and we are prepared to ask Congress for more money.”
Here is the NYT version.
Some European agencies say it will be difficult if not impossible for Ukraine to reclaim the land that Russia has taken since it invaded in February, but U.S. intelligence agencies are less pessimistic, officials said. Still, there are cracks in Ukraine’s defenses, and questions about the state of Ukraine’s military forces and strategy in the Donbas have created an incomplete picture for the United States.
In both cases, US officials are feel it is very important to stress that they do not agree with the pessimistic assessments of European governments while in the process of leaking that they agree with the pessimistic assessments of European governments.
Why does this matter? Well it indicates that the Biden Administration is not merely responding to a dynamic situation on the ground in Ukraine, or wrestling with the need to recalibrate its goals and rhetoric towards what the United States increasingly perceives reality to be. It is a matter of vital importance to the Administration that they not be seen as shifting their policy, rhetoric or positions. Oceania was always at war with Euarasia. The United States never committed to a Ukrainian recovery of Crimea or any territory in particular, the issue of regime change in Russia was never raised, and no promises were ever issued to provide the sort of military aid to carry-out such a policy.
I should be clear that I think the direction of this shift is towards a policy that is fundamentally correct. The United States never clearly defined what America’s interests were in the conflict, which made it impossible to establish what our goals were. This produced knock-on effects in which it became impossible to clarify to Kyiv what America wanted Ukraine to do, or to US allies. Taking a cue from rhetoric in the media, from senior figures in both parties, and even Austin/Blinken, Zelensky ruled out negotiations on anything less than Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders, only apparently to now have incurred the displeasure of Joe Biden. Yet France’s Emmanuel Macron also managed to attract criticism and American displeasure for communicating to Zelensky what appears, in fact, to have been Joe Biden’s actual position.
I have generally avoided too deep forays into American domestic politics, which is an oversaturated field to say the least. Nonetheless, it strikes me that a major source of the problems afflicting the Biden Administration is an inability to change course or admit errors with good grace. Even when required U-turns occur, they are delivered in such grudging terms that they alienate those whom they are intended to conciliate. The White House’s handling of Joe Manchin over its proposed spending plans have evinced this attitude from the start. Back in the spring of 2021, Manchin expressed substantive concerns about inflation, which now look prophetic, and the nature of funding within the bill which rather than fully funding any specific priorities, created a number of expiring grants in an effort to blackmail a future congress into renewing them. Rather than engaging on substance, the White House treated the entire process as an adversarial test of resolve, in which the goal was not to produce a better bill based upon Manchin’s input, but to concede the bare minimum to receive his vote. While they eventually conceded more than he had initially asked for, the process so alienated him that he no longer believed, rightly, that it was being conducted in good faith or with the right priorities.
I find this analogy relevant because it is not an isolated instance, but appears to represent the way the Administration has engaged with relevant stakeholders abroad. It perceives their role not as partners whose input might produce a better policy, but as potential obstacles that must be humored. Yet at the same time the Administration seems unable to take input, especially dissenting in good faith, it also is extremely poor at communicating what its own position or motives are. As a result, a farcical situation is produced in which consultations are one-sided, disdainful, and unproductive, after which countries which then try and implement the policies they believe the United States wishes them to follow find themselves rebuked.
In the case of Afghanistan, the Administration was exceedingly quick to blame various actors ranging from the US military, NATO Allies, and the Afghans themselves for the error of doing what the Biden Administration told them to do, rather than presumably, obstructing US policy. The same approach was taken with the fights over the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline, where the US denounced the project as a tool of Russian influence in June of 2021 when the then-CDU led government looked determined to push it forward, but changed its tune to suggesting that the project could actually provide leverage over Russia when the Green-influenced coalition looked like it might actually freeze the project last fall.
Where does this leave Ukraine? Absent a clear message from the United States, it will be next to impossible for Zelensky to abandon substantial territory in the East, much less make concessions in talks with Russia. Biden may well hope Zelensky ignores the US rhetoric designed for public consumption, reads between the lines of leaks and statements, and concludes that the US wants him to do that, but even if Zelensky can reach that conclusion, the political costs of doing so when critics can point to contrary “evidence” the US does not want him to compromise are enormous. Nor can Biden hope that Macron can succeed in playing the bad cop without clarity from the United States.
The most likely outcome then is that Ukraine will continue to do what it is doing to Biden’s increasing irritation. If a military setback occurs in the Donbas, these current leaks will be used to promote a message of “we told you so” from Administration officials, and Macron will simultaneously be blamed for urging Zelensky to follow a contrary course, and failing at the task. Inflation will continue to rise with the continuation of the conflict in its current form the scapegoat.