March 4th Ukraine Rundown
Where I rant about postwar Germany and both American and Russian Domestic Politics
I am posting this subject to editing as it was getting late. If I delayed further it would end up not being posted until events had overtaken my observations. The word count would then approach that of the Russian literature about the Napoleonic wars that is being cancelled from American schools.
Military Overview
(Source https://twitter.com/War_Mapper)
Today was a quiet day. The media exhausted themselves with coverage of the assault on the Zaporizhzhian nuclear plant. Alarmism and fake news has been common, but the sheer degree of hysteria spreading overnight seems to have caused everyone to back off when little followed.
The day ended with rumors of a Ukrainian counterattack outside of Kharkiv involving tanks and artillery. Leaving aside historical evidence that any Russian military operations around the city are cursed, this offensive makes sense if Ukrainian forces capable of launching a counteroffensive exist in the area. Moving those forces elsewhere would require both fuel and time, two commodities Ukraine does not possess in excess. While redeploying they would be vulnerable to air attack, and those Ukrainian forces would be entirely absent from Ukrainian battle line while in transit. Much better to use them where they are, than to remove them from the field entirely for an indeterminate time, while risking their destruction. At worst they generate a positive story for the Western media(and given we have not heard dramatically more beyond photos of a captured T-80 tank which we would if they had won a major victory that is likely what this amounted to) and at best they may dislocate the Russian forces. All we can be sure of is that Kharkiv is not under immediate military threat.
Military Coverage
Coverage of the military situation is skewed by the concentration of journalists and correspondingly information around Kyiv and Kharkiv, where the Russian advance has either been halted or abandoned for the time being(in favor of artillery) depending on your viewpoint. I tend to believe the two are not mutually exclusive. Russian advances in the two areas ran into the greatest difficulty, those victories attracted attention, Ukraine subsequently concentrated their best units in the two locations, aided by Kyiv in particular being located relatively near to the Dnieper meaning that reinforcements would not have to move through open country while exposed in the same way they would if they were reinforcing the Eastern front. Faced with this resistance, the Russians prioritized artillery assaults rather than risking heavy losses from ground assaults which would produce demoralizing coverage of prisoners and destroyed equipment.
In turn, precisely because the Russian advance in the South is mobile - Russian forces appear to have near free rein of the countryside and roads except for their own logistic limitations and the occasional drone attack - there is little to no coverage as fighting does not occur unless Russian forces attempt to enter a location where a substantial Ukrainian force is present. As the Russian approach appears to be not to try and take defended positions with recon forces(evidenced by how they waited more than two days after their forces first passed through Kherson to attempt to take the city) most battles are over either with a bloodless Russian takeover or with a hasty Russian retreat, long before journalists arrive. That the vast majority of these small engagements involve Russian recon forces pulling back when they encounter resistance means that they are reported as “Ukrainian” victories. But these Ukrainian “victories” do not amount to anything operationally, and the result is reporting where Ukrainians win all of the battles except the major ones in the South, yet the Russians keep advancing.
There is next to no coverage from besieged Mariupol. We can be fairly sure conditions are bad there. But the absence of coverage skews it further to Kyiv, This probably serves the interests of both sides. For the Russians, it allows them to avoid what are probably the most brutal images of destruction anywhere in the war. On the Ukrainian side, it has allowed units such as the Azov Battalion to ration their exposure, promoting themselves to friendly online audiences while remaining entirely out of sight to mainstream media outlets.
The net effect, however, is a picture where the individual stories paint a picture of a Russian offensive which is stalled(in the North), losing most battles yet somehow advancing(in the South), and operating out of sight(the East). This opens the door to speculation where on one side some Pro-Ukraine analysts can begin to read that the Russian army is near collapse while on the other, Pro-Russian ones can argue that the coverage is missing the big picture.
In responding to some feedback on Twitter that I may be an optimist for Ukrainian prospects, I believe that despite all of the weaknesses of the Russian offensive, the seriousness of sanctions, and Western support, if Putin wishes to take everything to the East of the Dnieper he probably can. That includes Kyiv and Kharkiv. I am far less certain of what will be left of the Russian army after that. I wrote my dissertation on the creation of modern Croatia, and I am struck by the experiences of the Yugoslav People’s Army. A modern mechanized force wears down quickly in extended combat. It is underestimated how much even the 2003 campaign in Iraq exhausted many American units.
This will not effect the ability to conduct sieges. The thing about besieging cities, hammering them with artillery, and advancing through limited assaults is that it reduces the operational stress on the troops. The longer your forces remain in one place, which they will during a siege, the easier it is to regularize supply infrastructure. Winning becomes a matter of simply pouring enough resources in. And if the Russian Federation lacks the resources to take Kyiv and Kharkiv after 6 weeks, then we will be looking at the Federation’s collapse.
It will mean that any attempt to resume operations after those sieges would in effect involve an entirely new invasion. All of those months of deployment and buildup in Russia and Belarus will have been spent getting Russian units into their current siege positions. Supply lines will have been entirely dedicated to supporting those operations. Recon forces of the type advancing from the Crimea might be able to rapidly penetrate West of the Dnieper. But if they face resistance beyond their ability to overcome, it will take weeks if not longer for Russian forces to be able to conduct new operations on par with those with which they opened the war.
The result is that I expect there to be two wars. One will be the current campaign which will end either with a cease-fire or with Russian troops eventually forcing the capitulation of Kharkiv, Mariupol, and probably Kyiv and Odessa(I am skeptical of Russian ability to operate that far using primarily naval support, especially if the Ukrainians end up with anti-ship weapons.) The second will be any subsequent campaign. That will either be a walkover, an extended operation(which will likely fail), or will not happen at all.
Let’s Talk About Tanks
There has been some talk on twitter that the success of Javelins, one US report claims that 280 Russian vehicles were destroyed out of 300 fired, makes armored war obsolete. This involves a fundamental understanding of tank warfare.
Tanks are not tactically offensive weapons. The perception that tanks are some sort of military bulldozers destroying everything in theirs paths is a myth created by media, and reinforced in the current generation by videogames. One of the most accurate simulation games I played growing up, the Operational Art of War, received criticism for providing tanks higher “defense” stats than “attack” ones. But this reflected reality. Tanks are tactically defensive but operationally offensive weapons as the Germans showed early in World War II, tanks raced behind enemy lines to occupy key bridges or crossroads, and then held them against infantry counterattacks until friendly infantry could arrive to reinforce them.
From the moment they were first utilized at the Battle of the Somme in 1916, Generals have attempted to use tanks in frontal assaults on prepared defensive positions, and virtually without exception, those attacks have ended in disaster. That was true for the Pakistanis against India, but it was true even for the Israelis in 1973 when they overconfidently decided to assault entrenched Egyptian forces. Even in September 1939, a small force of Polish infantry with anti-aircraft guns was able to hold off Panzers. Polish Calvary might have not been able to attack German Panzers successfully, but German Panzers did not have much luck against dug-in Polish infantry with any sort of anti-tank weapons whatsoever.
See two examples below:
It is therefore not surprising that the result of Russian forces using tanks in frontal assaults on prepared infantry armed with modern anti-tank hardware is heavy losses. Ultimately, when used on the tactical offensive, rather than the operational offensive(as the Germans did), tanks are ultimately artillery pieces with less range, worse accuracy, most of which cannot fire while moving, and even those which can rarely can hit anything without trained crews. Iraq used them as mobile artillery pieces for infantry against Iran, as did Russia in Chechnya and that appears to be what Russia is doing with entirely predictable results.
This does not mean the Javelin is not uniquely good. Nor does it mean the Russian equipment is not poor, especially T-72s which are 50 years old. But even a well-trained army with modern equipment like the Israelis could get results this bad if they decided to use their tanks in this way.
Nuclear Information War
It is the end of the week, and the world has survived nuclear annihilation after a battle between Russian and Ukrainian forces at “Europe’s largest nuclear plant.” A day after the events the whole affair is mildly embarrassing, with the Western media, taking the lead from Twitter, breathlessly echoing claims by the Ukrainian Foriegn Minister that the battle risked a disaster ten times worse than Chernobyl. Coverage was likely influenced by the entire battle taking place in the middle of the night when senior figures on both sides were asleep, but it demonstrated an alarming trend to sensationalist coverage.
It also illustrates a liability for the Ukrainians in a longer war. Ukraine has achieved enormous success in shaping Western narratives. But the level of engagement may not be sustainable over an extended period. Human nature requires situations to either escalate, or “boredom” results. Ukraine is under attack, and they do not need to fabricate stories to elicit sympathy. But by running their campaign for world support like a social media influencer, they have fallen victim to the same temptations to up the ante. Threatening global nuclear catastrophe last night was an example, and a few more scares like that will render an increasingly sizable audience numb to actual imagery and stories.
I realize it is popular for non-Western and even some Western isolationist/anti-war voices to suggest that this is not a Ukrainian campaign at all, but a project of Western Intelligence Services or “globalists” but occam’s razor argues against that conclusion. Western governments, including the Biden Administration played down the extent of likely retaliation against Russia prior to the invasion, even when it might have proved effective as a deterrent. The current degree of support for Ukraine is driven by public opinion.
To the extent to which that opinion is being incited, the primary target is not the Kremlin, but domestic opponents perceived as vulnerable due to their association with it. Sean Hannity has used public hostility to Putin and sympathy for the Ukraine to launch a war for control of Fox News against Tucker Carlson. Across the US, elements of the Republican party and Conservative movement who have watched the rise of “public intellectuals” and political figures advocating a “traditional conservative” often “traditional Catholic” “populism” with disquiet. Many of those members of the “New Right” praised Putin’s perceived opposition to “wokism” especially on LGBT issues have now left themselves vulnerable to charges of being Pro-Putin. The natural contrarianism of many of them - they are social conservatives not through any deep seated beliefs in a set of traditional values but because those views are unpopular with the powers that be in their social circles - they have reacted to near uniform support for Ukraine by scoffing at Ukrainian successes, highlighting Russian advances, and generally creating the impression they are rooting for a Russian victory which they perceive as vindication. In so doing they have crafted a noose for themselves which the large number of enemies who always hated them will be all too happy to use. Critics are correct then to note that these motivations have nothing to do with the Ukraine. They are wrong to suggest they have anything to do with Russia either.
That is not to say there are not those who are anti-Russian, or see the Russian war with Ukraine in exactly the same way many in the Kremlin do. As a proxy war between the United States and Russia. Which brings us to Lindsey Graham of South Carolina.
About that Regime Change Tweet
Late on the night of Thursday, March 3rd, South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham posted a tweet seemingly calling for the removal of Russian President Vladimir Putin, either through a coup, or assassination. It is probably best to let the Senator’s words speak for themselves.
A couple things need to be said about the Senator’s remarks. First of all, the historical comparisons are, as many commentators were quick to note, problematic. Both Brutus and Stauffenburg ultimately failed politically. Stauffenburg within less than 24hrs, Brutus when he met Caesar’s ghost again at Philippi. Nor were they remembered well by posteriority. Brutus’ name became a buzzword for treachery and betrayal, perhaps unfairly. Having completed Kathryn Tempest’s biography I am inclined to think that the “Republicans” had a cause worth fighting for, and had they prevailed things would have gone much better. I am also, for reasons I could write an entire substack post on, a major critic of Octavian as an individual and a leader, and believe Augustus enjoys an undeserved reputation for what was ultimately a politically destructive tenure. (I also feel in some ways Putin has more in common with a less successful Augustus than with his uncle Julius in any case. All of that, is, however, beside the point. Thanks to William Shakespeare and Dante Alighieri, Marcus Junius Brutus stands condemned to the deepest circle of hell along with Judas Iscariot in popular imagination. Why Graham thought this would be an example any senior Russian figure would wish to emulate is beyond me.
Stauffenberg faired little better. At the time, the July 20th Conspirators were nearly universally reviled by a German military and public which was at war, and where memories of the 1918 “Stab in the Back” myth resonated. It was common to hear it said that if Germany were to be defeated, at least there would be no “stab in the back” this time. Rather than discredit National Socialism, many felt Stauffenberg’s failed effort provided Hitler’s regime with an alibi.
It was only in the 1950s, when West Germany began to rearm as part of NATO that there was the need to create a military tradition which was free from the stench of Nazism. Stauffenberg and his friends, being conveniently dead, served a useful purpose as they could be used to represent the myth that another German military tradition existed. His living friends were not so lucky. When Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff , one of the most senior surviving members of the conspiracy tried to join the new Bundeswehr in the 1950s, he found his request blocked by former Wehrmacht officers who did not want a “traitor” in their ranks backed by Hans Globke, the one-time author of the Nuremberg laws who served as Chief of Staff to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.
Leaving aside the historical justifications, there were the political implications of a sitting US Senator posting what was in effect a call for a coup against a foreign government.
Pragmatically this tarred anyone considering carrying out such an act as an agent of US desires, if not an agent of the United States itself
Politically it fed Russian propaganda domestically and internationally that the goal of American policy not just today, but in the Ukraine since 2014 and potentially since 2004 or 1994 has been to overthrow and replace the government in Moscow.
It probably did not convince Putin that the United States is seeking regime change insofar as Putin almost certainly already knew that was the US goal. It was the US goal under Medvedev with reset, and it is the only coherent interpretation of US policy over the last decade, at least under Obama and Biden. It is only because I do not believe US policy is coherent, that I feel the Kremlin is wrong to perceive an orchestrated campaign aimed at regime change as opposed to a series of policy actions driven by wishful thinking that such an outcome might result.
Ultimately, I feel Western observers get a lot wrong about the nature of Putin’s regime in Russia. Not least they reverse the complexity of removing Putin, and figuring out what follows. The consensus appears to be that the former would be relatively easy - after all he is one man who could be felled by a bullet or poison - but the latter would be near impossible and likely to produce someone worse or end in anarchy.
I believe the opposite is true. If Putin were to drop dead tomorrow the Russian elite has known more or less exactly what they would do since 2008 or so, and they arguably tried to do it under Medvedev. Decentralize the regime, where “liberalization” meant greater freedom for oligarchs and security factions to pursue their own interests, especially on a regional level, without the zero-sum competition from above. In this context, freedom of speech and political pluralism did not mean the freedom for anyone to speak or run for office, but for different oligarchical factions. It is possible, though not stable, for the entire media and political system to be required to follow the line of a single man when everyone who agrees who that man is. If there is no single man, then that is impossible. More importantly, if you were to presume that the next President of Russia would inherit all of Putin’s powers, not just the de jure constitutional ones, but the de facto totalitarian ones, then how could anyone afford to let anyone else have the job?
The answer is they couldn’t. But Russia would need a President, and the solution would be to agree on the common denominator, likely following the Constitutional order of succession by going to the Prime Minister and then President of the Federation Council, but then reducing the stakes of the choice by unwinding the de facto powers Putin accumulated. It would not be about restoring freedom of speech. It would be about stripping the person of any “Acting President” of the right to censor all media, and decide who can and cannot run for and hold office.
While I am fairly certain virtually the entire Russian elite from oligarchs to even Putin’s inner Siloviki such as Surkov and Sechin would come together under a “Medvedev 2.0” in much the way Beria(initially) came together with Molotov, Khrushchev and Malenkov after Stalin died, it is important to note that they waited for Stalin to die.
There were plenty of reasons for Stalin’s inner circle to kill him before he died. They never did. Culturally, no one is going to launch a coup. The Russian military has never been a serious factor. They fell apart in August 1991, in 1917 the Generals forced out the Czar only to find their control of the troops melt away. In 1800 they pushed Czar Paul out a window. That is about it. One successful coup, one “success” which worked because there was no opposition and which led to a disaster, and a fiasco. Plenty of Russian elite figures will pray Putin has a stroke or falls down the stairs. They will do nothing to make it happen.